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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction Below 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
7002(a) of RCRA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). In dismissing the 
Complaint, the district court found that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. This appeal seeks review of that decision. 
Jurisdiction on Appeal 
On June 2, 2010, the district court granted New Union‟s 
motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment that 
“CARE‟s action is dismissed.”  Therefore, the district court‟s order 
is a final decision, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
This appeal presents the following issues: 
Whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition for revocation of 
EPA approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program, filed 
pursuant to RCRA § 7004. 
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition for revocation of 
EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program, filed 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
Whether EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition that EPA 
initiate proceedings to consider withdrawing approval of New 
Union‟s hazardous waste program under RCRA § 3006(e) 
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a 
constructive determination that New Union‟s program continued 
to meet RCRA‟s criteria for program approval under RCRA § 
3006(b), both subject to judicial review under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) 
and 7006(b). 
Assuming the answer to Issue I and Issues II and/or III is 
positive, whether this Court should lift the stay in C.A. No. 18-
2010 and proceed with judicial review of EPA‟s constructive 
actions, or should remand the case to the lower court to order 
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EPA to initiate and complete proceedings to consider withdrawal 
of New Union‟s hazardous waste program. 
Assuming this Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s 
challenge, whether EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s program because its resources and performance fail to 
meet RCRA‟s approval criteria. 
Assuming this Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s 
challenge, whether EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act effectively withdraws railroad 
hazardous waste facilities from regulation. 
Assuming this court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s 
challenge, whether EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders New Union‟s program not 
equivalent to the federal RCRA program, inconsistent with the 
federal program and other approved state programs, or in 
violation of the Commerce Clause. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural Background 
 Citizen Advocates for Regulation and the Environment 
(CARE) filed a citizen‟s suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Union on January 4, 2010 seeking an 
injunction requiring the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to either act on their pending petition or, alternatively, for 
the court to review an alleged constructive denial of the petition 
by EPA. Soon after the filing, New Union successfully obtained 
status as an intervenor in accordance with Rule 24 in the case 
before the district court and in the petition for review filed with 
the Court of Appeals, which CARE filed simultaneously with the 
action pending in the district court. The Court of Appeals stayed 
proceedings on the petition filed before them pending a decision 
in the district court. 
On June 2, 2010, the district court rendered its decision on 
cross-motions for summary judgment filed by CARE and New 
Union. In granting New Union‟s petition for summary judgment, 
the court opined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 
3
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7002(a)(2) and 7006(b), and 28 USC § 1331. CARE and EPA both 
filed appeals with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Twelfth Circuit, which will now review the claims. 
Factual Background 
In 1986, pursuant to its authority under RCRA, EPA 
approved New Union‟s hazardous waste program to operate in 
lieu of the federal program. Although CARE admits that New 
Union‟s program was indeed in accordance with RCRA guidelines 
at the time of approval, it contends that the state‟s 
administration of its RCRA program has incrementally lapsed. 
CARE contends that the resources allocated to the program 
have decreased significantly, preventing the state from effectively 
administering the program.  New Union‟s RCRA program 
oversees permitting, inspections, and enforcement. CARE alleges 
that New Union is not adequately addressing demands on the 
state hazardous waste program. CARE further argues that a 
number of statutes adopted by New Union are inconsistent with 
its duties and obligations under the program; CARE‟s petition 
alleges that these statutes have withdrawn from regulation a 
number of facilities whose oversight is mandated by RCRA, and 
have even eliminated certain forms of waste from regulation in 
violation of the federal program, and the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution. In light of these alleged failures, on January 5, 
2009, CARE petitioned EPA to withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s state RCRA program under Sections 7006(b) and 
7002(a)(2).  EPA has not yet acted on this petition. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program was 
a rulemaking rather than an adjudication because it created a 
generally applicable rule that had future effect.  Since the 
approval was a rulemaking, the district court has jurisdiction to 
order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition pursuant to RCRA § 
7002(a)(2).  Additionally, the more general 28 U.S.C. § 1331 must 
yield RCRA‟s more specific jurisdictional provision, and thus the 
district court does not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to 
order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition. 
EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition to withdraw approval 
of New Union‟s hazardous waste program did not constitute a 
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constructive denial of the petition and constructive determination 
that New Union‟s program continued to meet approval 
requirements because it did not represent the culmination of 
EPA‟s decisionmaking process.  Because EPA has not taken an 
action which qualifies as a final agency action, the suit is not yet 
ripe for judicial review under either RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) or 
7006(b).  Furthermore, CARE‟s petition is time barred since it 
was filed after the expiration of the 90-day statute of limitations 
contained in those sections. 
Assuming that the district court has jurisdiction under RCRA 
§ 7002(a)(2) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and assuming that EPA‟s 
failure to respond to CARE‟s petition constituted a constructive 
denial and constructive determination, and the Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to review these two actions under RCRA § 
7006(b), the Court should not lift the stay on C.A. No. 18-2010.  
Rather, the Court should remand to the district court to order 
EPA to begin withdrawal proceedings under RCRA §§ 3006(e) 
and 7004 because this is in the interest of judicial economy and 
best carries out Congressional intent. Assuming that the Court 
proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s challenge, EPA is not required 
to withdraw its approval of New Union‟s approved state program.  
New Union‟s hazardous waste program continues to meet the 
approval requirements detailed in 40 C.F.R. Part 271, including 
permitting, inspection, and enforcement functions. 
Amendments made to the Railroad Regulation Act (RRA) by 
the Environmental Regulatory Adjustment Act (ERAA) have no 
bearing on approval status since these changes do not render 
New Union‟s program deficient under the requirements of state 
hazardous waste programs; this is true even taking into account 
the removal of explicit state criminal sanctions. Federal 
enforcement mechanisms remain in place, and New Union‟s 
program remains in accordance with the enforcement 
requirements necessary for approval.  In fact, the ERAA does not 
affect the equivalency of New Union‟s state program with the 
federal program and does not create inconsistencies with federal 
and other approved state programs.  In addition, the ERAA‟s 
treatment of Pollutant X does not place New Union‟s hazardous 
waste disposal program in violation of the Commerce Clause 
since state actions that use the least discriminatory means 
possible to address legitimate state concerns that outweigh any 
5
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apprehension of interruption to the flow of commerce do not 
violate the Commerce Clause. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The questions of law to be evaluated by this Court should be 
reviewed de novo.  Theriot, Inc. v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 
395 (5th Cir. 1998).  Review of federal agency action is governed 
by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006), and 
should only be overturned if it “relied on factors which Congress 
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that is could not be ascribed to a difference in view 
or to the product of agency expertise.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
ARGUMENT 
I. RCRA § 7002(A)(2) PROVIDES JURISDICTION 
FOR DISTRICT COURTS TO ACT ON CARE’S 
PETITION FOR THE REVOCATION OF EPA’S 
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S HAZARDOUS 
WASTE PROGRAM. 
RCRA § 7002(a)(2) grants citizens the right to commence a 
civil action in the appropriate district court against the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for 
an alleged failure to perform a mandatory duty. 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(2) (2006).  The lower court erred when it found that it did 
not have jurisdiction under RCRA § 7002(a)(2) and granted New 
Union‟s motion for summary judgment on the issue.  The district 
court does have jurisdiction to order EPA to act on CARE‟s 
petition because EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste 
program was a rulemaking, and thus the district court has 
jurisdiction to order EPA to act under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and 
7004. 
A. EPA’s Approval of New Union’s Hazardous Waste 
Program Constituted a Rulemaking rather than an 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/4
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Adjudication. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines a rule in § 
551(4) as “[t]he whole or part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).  
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 
441 (1915) make the distinction between what agency actions 
constitute orders (the output of adjudicatory procedures), and 
what actions constitute rules (the output of the rulemaking 
procedure), respectively. Justice Holmes distinguished Bi-
Metallic, in which Colorado increased the value of all taxable 
property in Denver by forty percent, from Londoner, where a tax 
was apportioned to individual property owners based on the 
proportion of the benefits they received.  239 U.S. at 445-46.  
Holmes illustrated the distinction between rulemaking and 
adjudication when he stated that “[i]n Londoner v. Denver . . . a 
relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were 
exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds . . . 
but that decision is far from reaching a general determination 
dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in 
a county had been laid.” Id. 
The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act (1947) further clarifies the distinction between a 
rule and an order. A rule may be of either general or particular 
applicability for either a class or a single person. Id. at 13. A 
defining characteristic of a rule is that it is “of future effect, 
implementing or prescribing future law.” Id. In contrast, an order 
defines “past and present rights and liabilities.” Id.  The Supreme 
Court of California has described “adjudicatory matters” as 
instances that impact individuals and are “determined by facts 
particular to the individual case,” whereas rulemakings “involve 
the adoption of a „broad, generally applicable rule of conduct on 
the basis of public policy.‟” Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura, 596 P.2d 
1134, 1138 (Cal. 1979). 
Courts have determined that when EPA makes changes to 
state RCRA programs, these actions are rulemakings under the 
APA.  For example, in U.S. v. Southern Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 
2d 201 (D.C.R.I. 2009), the petitioners challenged an action in 
which EPA approved a change to Rhode Island‟s RCRA statute 
7
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that granted conditional exemptions to small quantity generators, 
a regulation more stringent than the federal program. Despite 
the fact that the approved modification was specific to the Rhode 
Island RCRA program, the court was nonetheless convinced that 
EPA‟s approval constituted a rulemaking. Id. The court stated 
that EPA‟s decision to use notice and comment procedures and to 
allow for public participation indicated that “EPA intended to use 
its legislative rulemaking authority in authorizing the changes to 
Rhode Island‟s program.” Id. at 212 (citations omitted). The court 
additionally noted that “the authorization imposed new standards 
and other affirmative obligations on hazardous waste generators 
in Rhode Island not already outlined in the law.” Id. at 212-13. 
The principle distinctions between rulemaking and 
adjudication described above make clear that the approval of a 
state hazardous waste program is a rulemaking rather than an 
adjudication.  EPA has the authority to enact regulations via 
rulemaking. 42 U.S.C. § 6912 (2006).  In approving New Union‟s 
state program, EPA‟s action created a general guideline with 
wide-sweeping effect on all waste generators and any other party 
interested in the handling of hazardous waste throughout the 
state, not just one party.  In addition, the state program had 
future effect, rather than retroactive or present effect. By 
following the notice and comment procedures required under APA 
§ 553, including publication of notice in the Federal Register, the 
state program could not have effect for at least 30 days following 
publication. Finally, similarly to U.S. v. Southern Union Co., the 
newly approved state hazardous waste plan imposed a set of new 
standards and obligations on all affected parties within New 
Union. Therefore, this action was clearly a rulemaking as opposed 
to an adjudication. 
B. EPA’s Categorization of its Action is Entitled to 
Deference by the Court. 
Although the lower court is correct in its assertion that the 
EPA is not entitled to the level of deference discussed in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), in regard to its determination of whether or not their 
action constitutes a rulemaking or an adjudication, the courts 
have still afforded some degree of deference to the agency‟s 
categorization if its own action. The court in British Caledonian 
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Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 584 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) examined the action of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 
formulating the requirements on tariffs for carriers performing 
charter flights. The plaintiff petitioned the court to review the 
Board‟s action because it contended that the Board‟s declaratory 
order actually constituted a rulemaking and, since it did not go 
through APA § 553 notice and comment procedure, should be 
deemed invalid. Id. at 983.  The court stated that an agency has 
discretion to decide whether to proceed by a rulemaking or 
adjudication. Id. at 993. 
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 
202 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000), the plaintiffs challenged an order 
issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT) regarding air 
passenger services. In determining that DOT‟s action constituted 
an order, the court stated that “[i]n determining whether an 
agency action constituted adjudication or rulemaking, we look to 
the product of the agency action. We also accord significant 
deference to an agency‟s characterization of its own action.” Id. at 
797.  Since an order is the outgrowth of an adjudicatory action, 
and since the agency categorized its action as a declaratory order, 
the court therefore found “that the agency engaged in 
adjudication rather than rulemaking.” Id. at 797-98. 
In the case at hand, the lower court erred by failing to give 
any degree of deference to EPA‟s characterization of its decision 
to approve New Union‟s RCRA program.  EPA characterized its 
action as a rulemaking and followed notice and comment 
procedures under APA § 553. See CARE v. EPA, Civ. 000138-2010 
(June 2, 2010). As such, EPA is entitled to deference concerning 
this characterization, and the approval should be treated as a 
rulemaking. 
C. The District Court has Jurisdiction to Order EPA to 
Act on CARE’s Petition under RCRA § 7002(a)(2). 
Under RCRA § 7002(a)(2), a petitioner may commence an 
action against the Administrator for an alleged failure to perform 
a nondiscretionary duty in the proper district court. 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(2) (2006).  Under RCRA § 7004, “any individual may 
petition the administrator for the promulgation, amendment, or 
repeal of any regulation . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (2006).  Section 
9
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7004 also requires that the Administrator “shall take action with 
respect to such petition,” indicating that responding to CARE‟s 
petition was a nondiscretionary duty. Id. (emphasis added). 
Because EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste 
program was a rulemaking, CARE properly petitioned EPA under 
RCRA § 7004.  Under § 7004, EPA is required to respond to such 
petitions, and failed to do so.  Therefore, CARE properly brought 
suit under § 7002(a)(2) to compel the Administrator to perform 
her nondiscretionary duty by responding to the petition, and the 
district court has jurisdiction to hear that claim and to order EPA 
to take such action. 
II. THE GENERAL, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, MUST YIELD TO 
THE SPECIFIC, RCRA. 
Having established that the action in question is a rule, the 
analysis must progress with this distinction in mind.  When 
reviewed in a vacuum, the EPA‟s rule-making action would lend 
itself to an exercise of federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  However, when considering the issues at 
hand in the aggregate, the general 28 U.S.C. § 1331 must yield to 
the specific, RCRA.  See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 
U.S. 753 (1961); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 
(1981) (finding as a general rule that a specific statute controls 
over a general one without regard to priority of enactment).  As 
such, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition. 
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Company, an injured 
felon on work-release, Green, brought a product liability action 
against the manufacturer of a commercial dryer which he claimed 
caused him to lose his arm.  490 U.S. 504 (1981).  During the 
trial, the defense impeached Green‟s character by eliciting 
admission that Green had been convicted of conspiracy to commit 
burglary and burglary, both felonies.  Id. at 506.  On appeal, 
Green argued that the district court erred in denying Green‟s 
pretrial motion to exclude the impeaching evidence.  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‟s ruling, holding that 
Rule 609(a), which allowed impeachment of a witness by prior 
felony convictions in a civil context, was not subject to a Rule 403 
balancing test. Id.  Thus, the judge had no duty to exclude the 
evidence in light of its prejudicial value. Id.  In the Supreme 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/4
04 Sive_Award 4/24/2011  2:28 AM 
2011] DAVID SIVE AWARD WINNER 103 
Court‟s majority opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that Rule 609 
contains it own weighing language and its specificity meant the 
application of the more general Rule 403 balancing test would go 
against what Congress clearly intended by including explicit 
language to the contrary within Rule 609.  Id. at 526. 
The lower court here made note of this “old maxim of 
statutory interpretation that the specific governs over the 
general,” citing Green v. Bock, 490 U.S. 504. CARE v. EPA, Civ. 
000138-2010 (June 2, 2010).  EPA agrees with the trial court that 
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), is a general statutory authority for 
rulemaking petitions, while RCRA § 7002 is the specific statutory 
authority for such an action under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 
(2006). As such, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) is replaced by the overlapping 
and more specific provisions of RCRA.  Such a finding is 
analogous to the Court‟s holding in Green; had Congress intended 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 to be the source of jurisdiction for rulemaking 
petitions under RCRA it would have remained silent on the 
matter and omitted the jurisdictional element of RCRA § 7002.  
See 490 U.S. at 526.  As such, the district court does not have 
jurisdiction to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. 
III.  EPA’S FAILURE TO ACT ON CARE’S PETITION 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONSTRUCTIVE 
DENIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
DETERMINATION. 
Although EPA has not yet responded to CARE‟s petition to 
revoke approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program, this 
inaction in and of itself does not constitute a constructive denial 
of the petition and a constructive determination that New Union‟s 
program continues to meet approval criteria.  Even if this 
inaction were a constructive denial and determination, it is not a 
final agency action and thus is not subject to judicial review 
under either RCRA § 7002(a)(2) or § 7006..  Additionally, the suit 
is time barred and thus is also precluded from judicial review by 
this court under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and 7006. 
11
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A. EPA’s Failure to Act on CARE’s Petition does not 
Constitute a Constructive Denial. 
In Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the 
Sierra Club petitioned  EPA to add strip mines to its list of 
fugitive emissions sources under the Clean Air Act (CAA).  Id. at 
785. Although the agency stated that it was gathering 
information, it failed to take action on Sierra Club‟s request for 
nearly two years. Id.  Petitioners brought a citizen suit similar to 
the claim at issue here, arguing that by not responding to the 
petition, the Administrator had failed to perform a 
nondiscretionary duty under the CAA. Id. at 787. 
The court said that a duty of timeliness exists if the statute 
“categorically mandate[es] that all specified action be taken by a 
date-certain deadline.” Id. at 791. The court assessed a number of 
factors in making the determination of whether the petitioner has 
a right to timely decision making, including whether there are 
Congressionally-imposed deadlines on the agency, if “the 
statutory scheme implicitly contemplates timely final action,” if 
there will be an effect on the petitioner‟s interests aside from 
timely decisionmaking, and if there will be an adverse effect on 
the agency in dealing with more pressing matters should the 
court require expedition of the process. Id. at 797. The court then 
stressed the deference due to the agency in developing a 
timetable for action: “[w]hen we assess these factors, we must 
remember that „[a]bsent a precise statutory timetable or other 
factors counseling expeditious action, an agency‟s control over the 
timetable of a rulemaking proceeding is entitled to considerable 
deference.” Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 658 
(D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
In order for an agency‟s failure to act to constitute a 
constructive denial, the agency inaction must have “precisely the 
same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief.” Id. at 
793. Further, the inaction should represent an “agency 
recalcitrance . . . in the face of a clear statutory duty . . . of such 
magnitude that it amounts to an abdication of statutory 
responsibility.” Id.  It is clear that EPA‟s inaction in the case at 
hand did not constitute a constructive denial and constructive 
determination.  EPA was not under a specific deadline for 
responding to CARE‟s petition.  Although some time has passed 
since the petition was submitted, EPA has many pressing 
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concerns to address and must prioritize among them, and EPA is 
entitled to some deference in these decisions.  This inaction does 
not represent “agency recalcitrance,” but rather is simply a delay 
in beginning investigations needed to properly respond to the 
petition. 
The case before the Court is easily distinguishable from Scott 
v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984), in which the 
court found that there was a “constructive submission.” In that 
case, EPA required states to promulgate total maximum daily 
loads (TMDLs) for certain identified pollutants for the waters 
within their borders within 180 days.  Id. at 996-97. When the 
states did not make their submissions to EPA within the allotted 
time period, the court found that the delay may have constituted 
a “constructive submission” that TMDLs for Lake Michigan were 
unnecessary. Id. at 997. The court further added that “the states‟ 
inaction in view of the short statutory deadlines, may have 
ripened into a refusal to act.” Id. at 997-98 (emphasis added).  In 
comparison, there is no statutorily imposed deadline on EPA to 
act on petitions for withdrawal under RCRA § 3006(e). 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6296(e) (2006). Without such deadlines, it is within the agency‟s 
discretion to determine when action is appropriate.  Thus, EPA 
inaction in this case does not constitute a constructive denial of 
the permit and constructive determination that New Union‟s 
hazardous waste program continues to meet approval criteria. 
B. CARE’s Suit is not Ripe for Judicial Review because 
a Constructive Determination is not a Final Agency 
Action. 
Even if the Court finds there was a constructive denial, this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case under RCRA § 
7006 because a constructive denial is not a final agency action. 
See Sierra Club v. EPA, 922 F.2d 337, 347.  The APA provides 
that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are 
subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).  The Supreme 
Court has articulated a two part analysis for determining if an 
action constitutes a “final agency action” for purposes of judicial 
review. An action is “final” if (1) it represents “the „consummation‟ 
of the agency‟s decisionmaking process” and is not “merely 
tentative or interlocutory [in] nature;” and (2) it is an action “by 
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which „rights and obligations have been determined,‟ or from 
which „legal consequences will flow.‟” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 177-78 (1997) (citations omitted). See also Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1976).  Additionally, EPA has not 
taken final action if they have merely deferred taking action. Am. 
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
In this case, EPA‟s alleged constructive denial of CARE‟s 
petition is not a final agency action and thus is not reviewable by 
this Court.  The fact that EPA has not yet made a decision 
concerning CARE‟s petition does not represent the 
“consummation of the agency‟s decisionmaking process.” Bennett, 
520 U.S. at 178.  EPA was not required to act on the petition 
within a specific time frame. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  Indeed, 
EPA could take action on the petition today and render the 
court‟s consideration of this issue moot.  Nothing has been 
published in the Federal Register concerning the petition. See 42 
U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006); Am. Portland Cement Alliance v. EPA, 
101 F.3d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  These factors indicate that 
the Agency‟s decisionmaking process has not yet been fully 
carried out, and weigh against it being considered a final agency 
action.  Because it is not a final agency action, this Court does not 
have jurisdiction to review it under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) or 7006. 
C. CARE’s Suit is Time Barred. 
Even if the Court finds that there was a constructive denial 
and determination, and these actions constituted final agency 
action and are ripe for review, the suit is time barred and as such 
judicial review is not available under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and 
7006. Section 7006(b) provides that judicial review under that 
section can only be had if the action is “made within ninety days 
from the date of such issuance, denial, modification, revocation, 
grant, or withdrawal, or after such date only if such application is 
based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth day.” 42 
U.S.C. § 6976(b) (2006).  The facts which CARE claims caused 
New Union‟s hazardous waste program to be inadequate arose 
years ago, and are clearly outside of the ninety day statute of 
limitations.  Even if CARE argues that the relevant date is the 
date on which EPA constructively denied their petition, there is 
no basis for determining when such denial occurred since Section 
7004(a) does not require the Administrator to act on a petition 
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within a specified time period. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  
Therefore, the action before this Court is time barred. 
IV.  THE COURT SHOULD REMAND TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO ORDER EPA TO BEGIN 
WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDINGS 
Assuming that the district court has jurisdiction under RCRA 
§ 7002(a)(2) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and assuming that EPA‟s 
failure to respond to CARE‟s petition constituted a constructive 
denial of the petition and a constructive determination that New 
Union‟s program continues to meet RCRA‟s approval criteria and 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review these two actions 
under RCRA § 7006(b), the Court should not lift the stay on C.A. 
No. 18-2010.  Rather, the Court should remand to the district 
court to order EPA to begin proceedings to consider withdrawal of 
New Unions RCRA program under RCRA §§ 3006(e) and 7004. 
A. It is in the Interest of Judicial Economy and Best 
Carries out Congressional Intent to Remand the 
Case. 
Under this set of assumptions, both the district court and the 
Court of Appeals could have jurisdiction to move forward with 
this case.  The district court has jurisdiction under RCRA § 
7002(a)(2) to hear CARE‟s citizen suit in which they are seeking 
an injunction requiring the Administrator to perform a 
nondiscretionary duty by acting on CARE‟s petition.  On the other 
hand, assuming that there was a constructive denial and 
constructive determination, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review EPA‟s actions under § 7006(b).  In this case, the Court 
should not lift the stay on C.A. No 18-2010, because it makes 
more sense given the statutory scheme and because it is in the 
interest of judicial economy to instead remand to the district 
court and require the district court to order EPA to begin 
withdrawal proceedings. 
Some courts have said that, under laws such as the Clean Air 
Act, if jurisdiction exists in both the Court of Appeals and the 
district court, then the Court of Appeals jurisdiction cancels out 
district court jurisdiction. See Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe 
v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  However, the 
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situation here is factually quite different, and the structure of 
RCRA suggests that in this case, the district court is best situated 
to move this case forward. 
The Oljato case involved national performance standards for 
coal fired power plants under the Clean Air Act.  The court found 
that that the Court of Appeals was the proper court to exercise 
jurisdiction because Congressional intent favored consistent 
application of national standards across the country and avoided 
bifurcated litigation. Id. at 660-61.  In the case at hand, however, 
lifting the stay and reviewing the constructive denial and 
determination in the Court of Appeals would go against 
Congressional intent. Congress assigned EPA the task of 
implementing RCRA and regulating hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6912 (2006).  EPA has the expertise to oversee RCRA, while the 
Court does not.  Congress expressed its intention that EPA and 
the states have broad discretion and flexibility in implementing 
federal and state hazardous waste programs in order to achieve 
the desired results. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,385 (May 19, 
1980).  This intent is best carried out by remanding to the district 
court, which will then order EPA to begin withdrawal 
proceedings.  EPA can then apply its process and expertise in 
assessing whether withdrawal is necessary or what changes New 
Union may need to make in order to correct any deficiencies in its 
program.  The Court of Appeals could then review EPA‟s actions 
afterward if need be.  This is more efficient than choosing to have 
this Court review the constructive denial and determination 
without the benefit of EPA‟s record.  As such, the Court should 
not lift the stay on C.A. No. 18-2010, and should instead remand 
to the district court to order the EPA to begin withdrawal 
proceedings. 
V. EPA IS NOT REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW ITS 
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S STATE PROGRAM. 
Assuming that the Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s 
challenge, EPA is not required to withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s approved state program.  While there may be some 
deficiencies in the available funding that have prevented New 
Union from carrying out its approved state program as fully as 
would be ideal, its resources and funding are still sufficient for 
EPA to continue to approve of New Union‟s state RCRA program.  
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In the alternative, even if New Union‟s resources and 
performance are insufficient to support EPA‟s continued approval 
of the state program, EPA is not required to withdraw its 
approval of the program.  Rather, EPA has discretion to initiate 
proceedings to withdraw the approval of any approved state 
RCRA program, and may take corrective actions other than 
simply withdrawing New Union‟s state program approval. 42 
U.S.C. § 6926 (2006). 
A. New Union’s Program is Sufficient for EPA’s 
Continued Approval 
RCRA § 3006 provides that states may develop and enforce 
their own hazardous waste programs to operate in lieu of the 
federal program.  Id.  State programs must be approved by the 
EPA Administrator before they can take effect.  Id. Approved 
state programs must be at least as stringent as the federal RCRA 
requirements, and are permitted but not required to be more 
stringent than the federal program. Id.  In addition, an approved 
state program must comply at all times with the requirements 
detailed in 40 C.F.R. Part 271, which describes the procedures 
and criteria for the approval, revision, and withdrawal of state 
hazardous waste programs.  40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (a), (c), and (g).  
Because the resources devoted to New Union‟s approved 
hazardous waste program and New Union DEP‟s performance in 
carrying out the program are sufficient to satisfy the standards 
for continued approval under 40 C.F.R. Part 271, EPA is not 
required to withdraw approval of the state program. 
i. Permitting 
The regulations applicable to state approved programs do not 
require the New Union DEP to respond to permit applications 
within a specified amount of time. Under 40 C.F.R. § 271.14 
(2010), certain provisions of Parts 124 and 270 are incorporated 
and applied to state permitting programs, and state permitting 
must comply with those specific provisions at all times.  None of 
these sections state a time period within which the state must 
respond to an application.  While RCRA § 3005 does include time 
periods in which the EPA or state must respond to a permit 
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application, those dates only apply to permit applications 
submitted before November 8, 1984.  42 U.S.C. § 6925(c) (2006). 
In fact, the regulations anticipate that the permitting 
authorities may not address permit applications immediately. In 
states with approved RCRA programs, the operation of a permit 
will continue indefinitely even after it has expired as long as the 
permittee has submitted a complete and timely application to 
renew the permit.  40 C.F.R. § 270.51(d) (2010).  The existing 
permit will remain in effect until the state issues or denies the 
new permit. Id.  Thus, while a backlog of permit applications is 
not ideal, Congress recognizes that efficiency and the interests of 
public health are best served under the current system.  This 
pragmatic approach puts no temporal cap on how much time 
states have to respond. 
ii. Inspections 
RCRA § 3007(e) describes the inspection requirements for 
state programs. A state with an approved program “shall 
commence a program to thoroughly inspect every facility for the 
treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste for which a 
permit is required . . . no less often than every two years . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 6927(e)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).  While the use of the 
word “shall” often indicates a mandatory duty on behalf of the 
state, the Supreme Court has noted that “shall” is sometimes 
incorrectly used when it is really intended to mean “will,” 
“should,” or “may.” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 
417, 432-33 n.9 (1995).  When this provision is read in context 
and in relation to other inspection regulations, it becomes clear 
that this is a case in which “shall” really indicates that 
inspections “should” be conducted on a biennial basis, but are not 
necessarily required to be conducted within that time period. 
Section 3007(e) of the Act goes on to say that the 
Administrator is required to promulgate regulations governing 
“the minimum frequency and manner of such inspections,” and in 
doing so may “distinguish between classes and categories of 
facilities commensurate with the risks posed by each class or 
category.” 42 U.S.C. § 6927(e)(1) (2006).  This indicates that the 
regulations may require different time periods in which 
inspections must occur, and that it is proper to prioritize facilities 
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by risk, much as New Union has done in deciding which facilities 
to inspect most frequently.  The corresponding regulations do not 
include a requirement concerning how often TSD facility 
inspections must be completed.  They only require “periodic 
inspections” that are capable of determining compliance, verifying 
the accuracy of information submitted by the permittee, and 
verifying that monitoring at the facility is adequate. 40 C.F.R. § 
271.15(b)(2) (2010).  These other provisions indicate that while it 
would be ideal to inspect facilities biennially, this is an 
aspirational goal rather than a strict requirement, and as such 
New Union‟s inspection program is adequate for purposes of 
continued approval of the state RCRA program. 
iii. Enforcement 
A State administered RCRA program is required to provide a 
State agency with a certain level of enforcement authority.  The 
agency must have the ability “to restrain immediately and 
effectively any person by order or by suit in state court from 
engaging in any unauthorized activity which is endangering or 
causing damage to public health or the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 
271.16(a)(1) (2010).  It must also have the authority “to sue in 
courts of competent jurisdiction to enjoin any threatened or 
continuing violation of any program requirement, including 
permit conditions, without the necessity of a prior revocation of 
the permit;” and the ability “to access or sue to recover in civil 
court penalties and to seek criminal remedies, including fines . . .” 
40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(1), (2) (2010). 
New Union‟s enforcement program includes all of these 
required components, and makes use of them in taking corrective 
actions against those violating state RCRA permits.  While there 
are violations that have gone unpunished, there is nothing in the 
statute or regulations that require the state to take action on 
each and every violation.  In addition, it is anticipated in the 
statute and regulations that states will have assistance from EPA 
and from citizens, as has occurred in New Union.  EPA retains 
some enforcement authority in states with approved programs 
under RCRA § 3008 and 40 C.F.R. § 271.19, and citizens can 
bring suit against anyone who is violating the terms of a RCRA 
permit under RCRA § 7002 and 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(d).  Therefore, 
New Union‟s enforcement program meets all requirements for 
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continued approval of its state RCRA program and the 
Administrator is not required to withdraw approval. 
B. EPA has Discretion to Take Action Other than 
Withdrawing Approval. 
Even if the resources that New Union has devoted to its 
RCRA program and New Union‟s implementation of the program 
are deemed inadequate, the Administrator still is not required to 
withdraw approval of New Union‟s approved RCRA program.  
The statute gives the Administrator discretion to determine 
whether withdrawal of approval is appropriate in a given 
circumstance. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006).  Additionally, EPA has the 
option to take corrective action to fix deficiencies in the state 
program instead of simply withdrawing approval. Id. 
The language used in both the statute and the regulations 
indicate that, while the Administrator has the authority to 
withdraw approval, she has discretion in choosing whether it is 
appropriate to do so.  Section 3006(e) gives the Administrator the 
authority to withdraw authorization of state programs. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6926(e) (2006).  Although under this section the Administrator 
must notify the state of deficiencies in the state program and 
must withdraw authorization if those problems are not corrected, 
the initial determination in which the Administrator finds that 
the state program is inadequate is not a mandatory duty. Id.  
This is an instance in which the Administrator may exercise 
discretion to determine that a state program is inadequate, and 
the related mandatory duties are only triggered after the initial 
determination has been made. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council 
v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976). 
The regulations list a number of circumstances which may 
lead the Administrator to withdraw program approval, including 
a failure to issue permits, to take action concerning permit 
violations, to take enforcement action, and to properly inspect 
and monitor regulated activities. 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a).  The 
regulations state that “[t]he Administrator may withdraw 
program approval when a State program no longer complies with 
the requirements of this subpart, and the State fails to take 
corrective action.” Id. (emphasis added).  This reinforces the 
conclusion that the Administrator has discretion as to whether to 
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begin proceedings to withdraw approval of a state program.  
Additionally, it highlights the fact that the Administrator must 
take other steps before simply withdrawing approval of the state 
RCRA program.  The Administrator needs to hold a public 
hearing, provide notice of deficiency to the state, and give the 
state ninety days to correct the program before the Administrator 
proceeds with the program withdrawal process. Id., 42 U.S.C. § 
6926(e) (2006). 
CARE brought this suit pursuant to RCRA‟s citizen suit 
provision in § 7002(a)(2).  This section provides that “any person” 
may bring suit to compel the Administrator to perform a non-
discretionary duty.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2006).  Because the 
EPA Administrator has discretion to make a determination 
concerning the adequacy of an approved state RCRA program, the 
Court lacks jurisdiction to compel the Administrator to withdraw 
approval of the state program.  Therefore, EPA is not required to 
withdraw approval of New Union‟s approved state RCRA 
program. 
VI. EPA IS NOT REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW ITS 
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S STATE PROGRAM 
BECAUSE OF CHANGES MADE TO THE RRA 
While CARE argues that ERAA effectively withdraws 
railroad hazardous waste from regulation, such an assertion is 
facially incorrect.  Rather, New Union has shifted regulation to a 
newly created New Union Railroad Commission. (R. at 3).  This 
transfer is a shifting of authority—not a complete dissolution of 
regulation by New Union.  In creating and implementing a 
Commission uniquely focused and attuned to the regulation of 
interstate railroad freight rates, railroad tracks and rights of 
way, and railroad ways, New Union has appropriately exercised 
the very power bestowed upon it by Congress in RCRA § 3006 
(providing that states may develop and enforce their own 
hazardous waste programs to operate in lieu of the federal 
program). 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006).  This arrangement does not 
render New Union‟s program deficient under the requirements of 
state hazardous waste programs.  40 C.F.R. Part 271 (2010). 
Even in light of the removal of explicit state criminal sanctions, 
federal enforcement mechanisms remain in place and 
unhindered, rendering New Union‟s program in accordance with 
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the enforcement requirements necessary for approval.  See United 
States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (D.C. Cal. 2000); 
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 
35, 44 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that federal criminal provisions of 
RCRA, notably 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), are meant to apply within 
states having authorized programs and that this federal criminal 
jurisdiction subsumes both states and federal permits). 
Even after EPA has granted authorization to a state 
program, there remains a strong federal presence. MacDonald, 
933 F.2d at 44. In MacDonald, the First Circuit affirmed that the 
federal government‟s ability to obtain criminal penalties against 
generators and other persons who knowingly transport hazardous 
waste absent proper permitting, even after granting approval to 
Rhode Island‟s state hazardous waste program.  Id. at 45.  
Appellants, hired to remove and clean up contaminated soil, had 
authorization to dispose of liquid, but not solid, waste.  Id. at 39.  
Lacking the proper permit, appellants were cited with violating 
criminal provisions within 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).  Id. at 43.  They 
argued that Rhode Island‟s authorized state program displaced 
the federal program, leaving no federal crime and ousting the 
federal court of jurisdiction.  Id.  The court found no merit in this 
contention, holding that § 6928(d) and companion federal 
criminal provisions “are meant to apply within states having 
authorized programs” and that had Congress intended otherwise 
“its intentions surely would have been manifested.” Id. at 44. 
ERAA amended the RRA by transferring “all standard 
setting, permitting, inspection, and enforcement authorities of 
the DEP under any and all state environmental statutes to the 
Commission.” (R. at 3).  The Commission, by design, is a state 
agency and the Commissioners are state employees, with 
appointees chosen by the Governor, State Senate, and State 
House of Representatives. Id.  CARE may wish to argue that 
ERAA‟s removal of criminal sanctions for violations of 
environmental statutes by facilities falling under the jurisdiction 
of the Commission leaves New Union in violation of the 
enforcement provision requirement. 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(ii) 
(2010).  Relevant jurisprudence renders such an assertion 
patently false. 
The intent of Congress is to have an ever-present 
enforcement of federal criminal sanctions, and New Union has 
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done nothing to hinder such an effort.  MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 
44.  In MacDonald, the silence of the Rhode Island program did 
not obstruct EPA from unilaterally enforcing RCRA‟s criminal 
provisions, and New Union‟s absence of criminal sanctions should 
be handled in the same manner.  Id. at 43. As such, the federal 
criminal enforcement mechanisms of RCRA, 40 C.F.R. § 271.16, 
remain in place within New Union. 
For the reasons above (See Part V.B.), even if it is found that 
New Union fails to meet the requirements under RCRA, EPA has 
discretion to initiate proceedings to withdraw the approval of any 
approved state RCRA program, and may take corrective actions 
other than simply withdrawing New Union‟s State program 
approval. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006). 
VII. EPA IS NOT REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW 
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S STATE PROGRAM 
DUE TO PASSAGE OF THE ERAA 
Assuming that the Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s 
challenge, the content of New Union‟s 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act (ERAA) does not lead to the 
conclusion that EPA must withdraw approval of New Union‟s 
approved state RCRA program.  The relevant provisions of ERAA 
amended the New Union hazardous waste program relating to 
the regulation of Pollutant X. (R. at 3).  ERAA requires that 
facilities generating Pollutant X submit and carry out plans to 
reduce generation of the pollutant each year until Pollution X 
generation ceases entirely. Id.  The Act prohibits DEP from 
issuing permits allowing treatment, storage or disposal of 
Pollutant X, except for temporary storage while awaiting 
transport to a treatment or disposal facility located outside the 
state. Id.  Additionally, Pollutant X can only be transported 
through or out of the state if transport is done as quickly and 
directly as possible. Id. 
RCRA § 3006(b) requires that a state program must not be 
approved if it is “not equivalent to the Federal program” or “not 
consistent with the Federal or State programs applicable in other 
states. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2010).  The Administrator has the 
power to withdraw approval of an approved state program if it no 
longer meets these requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006).  
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State programs also must not regulate hazardous waste, a 
recognized type of interstate commerce, in a manner that violates 
the Commerce Clause.  In this case, EPA is not required to 
withdraw approval of New Union‟s program because ERAA does 
not affect the program‟s equivalency to the federal RCRA 
program, does not render it inconsistent with federal or other 
approved state programs, and does not violate the Commerce 
Clause. 
A. ERAA does not Affect the State Program’s 
Equivalency with the Federal Program. 
Despite the changes made by ERAA, New Union‟s state 
RCRA program is still equivalent to the federal program. A state 
program does not have to be exactly the same as the federal 
program in order to be considered equivalent; because New 
Union‟s program is still at least as stringent as the federal 
program, it is considered equivalent to the federal RCRA 
program.  According to § 3006, a state program must be 
“equivalent” to the federal RCRA program in order to become and 
to continue as an approved state program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), (e) 
(2006). Equivalency is not defined in the statute, but is 
determined by EPA on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Determining Equivalency of State RCRA 
Hazardous Waste Programs, 1-2 (Sept. 7, 2005). 
RCRA includes a “savings clause,” which provides that “no 
State . . . may impose any requirements less stringent than those 
authorized under this subchapter respecting the same matter 
governed by such regulations . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).  
Additionally, it says that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prohibit any State . . . from imposing any 
requirements . . . which are more stringent than those imposed by 
such regulations.” Id. (emphasis added).  This indicates that the 
federal regulations create a floor, rather than a ceiling, for 
regulation of hazardous wastes.  The inclusion of this provision 
shows that Congress believed that “hazardous waste is not an 
area of particular federal importance requiring one uniform 
national system or plan of regulation.  In fact, although Congress 
recognized the need for federal regulation, it stated that „the 
collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be 
primarily a function of the State.‟”  Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. 
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N.J. Dept. of Environmental Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (2006)). 
EPA has determined that in assessing equivalency of a state 
program, the focus should be on whether the state program 
“provide[s] equal environmental results as the federal 
counterparts,” and not on whether the state regulations directly 
track federal requirements. EPA, Determining Equivalency, at 2. 
As such, the focus is on ensuring that state programs “meet the 
minimum national standards, rather than [focusing on] line-by-
line comparisons of State and Federal regulations.” 61 Fed. Reg. 
18,822 (Apr. 29, 1996).  This gives states flexibility to implement 
their own regulatory programs, consistent with RCRA‟s purposes 
and goal of hazardous waste regulation remaining primarily as a 
state function. 
New Union‟s program, as amended by ERAA, remains 
equivalent to the federal program.  ERAA‟s regulation of 
Pollutant X makes the state program more stringent than the 
federal program, not less so.  These more stringent requirements 
are permissible under RCRA‟s savings clause.  42 U.S.C. § 6929 
(2006).  The amended program continues to meet and exceed the 
applicable “minimum national standards.”  61 Fed. Reg. 18,822 
(Apr. 29, 1996).  ERAA also promotes RCRA‟s overall goals, 
including protection of human health and the environment, and 
reducing or eliminating hazardous waste generation. 42 U.S.C. § 
6902 (2006).  Therefore, New Union‟s state program remains 
equivalent to the federal RCRA program, and EPA is not required 
to withdraw its approval of the state program for this reason. 
B. ERAA does not Create Inconsistencies Between the 
New Union State Program and Federal or other 
Approved State Programs. 
EPA is also not required to withdraw approval of New 
Union‟s hazardous waste program because ERAA does not cause 
the program to be inconsistent with the federal or other approved 
state programs.  Under RCRA § 3006(b) and (e), an approved 
state hazardous waste program must be “consistent with the 
Federal or State programs applicable in other States;” if the 
Administrator finds that a program is inconsistent, she must 
begin proceedings to withdraw its approval. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a), 
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(e) (2006).  This language is vague and gives the agency broad 
discretion to implement this provision and corresponding 
regulations. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 
F.2d 1390, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
The regulations relating to consistency reiterate that state 
hazardous waste programs must be consistent with federal and 
other state programs, and also include further requirements. 40 
C.F.R. § 271.4 (2010).  First, a state program or aspect of a state 
program will be deemed inconsistent if it “unreasonably restricts, 
impedes, or operates as a ban on the free movement across the 
State border of hazardous wastes from or to other States for 
treatment, storage, or disposal at facilities authorized to operate 
under the Federal or an approved State program.” 40 C.F.R. § 
271.4(a) (2010).  Second, a state law or state program may be 
considered inconsistent if it “has no basis in human health or 
environmental protection and . . . acts as a prohibition on the 
treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste in the State.” 
40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (2010). 
The North Carolina state hazardous waste program‟s 
consistency was at issue in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council 
v. Reilly, 938 F.2d at 1390.  North Carolina passed a law 
requiring hazardous waste discharged into surface water to be 
diluted one thousand fold by the receiving river; this requirement 
rendered operations at a new state-of-the-art waste treatment 
facility economically infeasible. Id. at 1394.  The petitioners 
argued that by passing this law, North Carolina was failing to 
treat its share of the nation‟s hazardous waste. Id. at 1393.  An 
administrative law judge and the Regional Administrator found 
that withdrawal was not warranted, and the issue in the case 
became whether EPA had properly interpreted 40 C.F.R. § 
271.4(b) relating to consistency. Id. at 1394-95. 
Under EPA‟s interpretation, two requirements must both be 
met before withdrawal is warranted under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b): 
(1) the aspect of the program must have “no basis in human 
health or environmental protection” and (2) must “act as a 
prohibition on the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous 
waste in the State.” 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (2010); Hazardous Waste, 
938 F.2d at 1395. EPA‟s interpretation is that a state law only 
“prohibits” hazardous waste treatment when it “effects a total 
ban on a particular waste treatment technology within a state.” 
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Hazardous Waste, 938 F.2d at 1395.  The court deferred to the 
agency‟s interpretation of its own regulations because the 
interpretation was not “plainly wrong.” Id. (citing Chem. Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. EPA, 919 F.2d 158, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 844-45).  This interpretation was also consistent with the 
goal of encouraging states to develop their own programs by 
providing them with a level of flexibility in implementing their 
programs. Hazardous Waste, 938 F.2d at 1396; 45 Fed. Reg. 
33,290, 33,385 (May 19, 1980).  The court concluded that North 
Carolina‟s regulation did not constitute a statewide ban on a 
particular waste treatment technology, and as such it did not 
prohibit the treatment of hazardous waste under 40 C.F.R. § 
271.4(b). Hazardous Waste, 938 F.2d at 1397.  The court did not 
address whether the regulation had a basis in human health or 
environmental protection because it was unnecessary given the 
fact that it was not a prohibition, and both factors must be 
fulfilled in order for the state law to violate 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b). 
Id. 
This Court should undertake a similar analysis for ERAA‟s 
regulation of Pollutant X.  Under EPA‟s interpretation of 40 
C.F.R. § 271.4(b), ERAA does not create a statewide ban on the 
treatment, storage, or disposal of Pollutant X.  ERAA still allows 
for short-term storage of Pollutant X. New Union will no longer 
issue permits for treatment or disposal of Pollutant X, but there 
are no existing facilities that are able to carry out either of these 
functions in the state.  The regulation also provides for gradually 
eliminating any production of Pollutant X in New Union, so the 
need for such treatment and disposal facilities will not exist in 
the near future.  As such, interpreting the ERAA as a complete 
statewide ban on the treatment, storage or disposal of Pollutant X 
is flawed. 
Even if the Court does find that ERAA affects a total ban on 
treatment, storage, and disposal of Pollutant X in New Union, 
ERAA is based on legitimate concerns, including protecting 
human health and the environment.  As such, it is not 
inconsistent with 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b).  Both the World Health 
Organization and EPA have found that Pollutant X is “among the 
most potent and toxic chemicals to public health and the 
environment.” (R. at 3).  Additionally, there are no treatment or 
disposal facilities in New Union that can adequately handle 
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Pollutant X and prevent the public or the environment from 
exposure to the pollutant; in fact, there are only nine such 
facilities in the entire country. Id. The record shows that New 
Union has legitimate concern for the effect this pollutant will 
have on the public and on the environment.  Because ERAA is 
based on human health and environmental protection, New 
Union‟s program is not inconsistent under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b), 
since to be deemed inconsistent a program must both have no 
basis in protecting human health or the environment, and must 
act as a prohibition on treatment, storage, or disposal within the 
state. 
Additionally, New Union‟s hazardous waste program is not 
inconsistent under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a) (2010) because it does not 
“unreasonably [restrict, impede, or operate] as a ban on the free 
movement across the State border of hazardous wastes from or to 
other States for treatment, storage, or disposal.” (emphasis 
added).  ERAA does restrict the movement of Pollutant X within 
New Union; however, these restrictions are not unreasonable.  
People are free to transport Pollutant X through the state or out 
of the state, as long as they in a manner that is quick, direct, and 
which avoids unnecessary delay within the state.  DEP will still 
issue permits to allow for temporary storage of the pollutant 
while it awaits transport out of the state.  These restrictions are 
reasonable and are intended to limit any potential exposure to 
the pollutant.  They clearly do not ban free movement through or 
within the state.  As such, ERAA is also consistent with the 
federal and other state programs under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a). 
New Union‟s hazardous waste program also continues to be 
consistent with other approved state programs.  Pollutant X is a 
hazardous waste listed under RCRA § 3001. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 
(2006).  Under 40 C.F.R. § 271.9, states must list and control all 
hazardous wastes listed by the federal program.  New Union is 
clearly controlling Pollutant X, and under RCRA‟s savings clause, 
the state is free to impose restrictions that are more stringent. 42 
U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).  Because New Union has listed Pollutant X 
and has imposed at least the minimum requirements, its 
regulation of the pollutant is consistent with other state program, 
which must also meet these minimum standards.  Therefore, EPA 
is not required to withdraw approval of New Union‟s hazardous 
waste program because ERAA does not render the program 
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inconsistent under 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) and (e) and 40 C.F.R. § 
271.4. 
C. ERAA’s Treatment of Pollutant X does not Place 
New Union’s Hazardous Waste Disposal Program in 
Violation of the Commerce Clause. 
ERAA is State legislation designed to regulate hazardous 
waste, a recognized type of interstate commerce. It is well 
established that no state may attempt to isolate itself from a 
problem common to the several states by raising barriers to the 
free flow of interstate commerce. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 
U.S. 617, 628 (1978).  However, states that use the least 
discriminatory means possible to address legitimate state 
concerns that outweigh any apprehension of interruption to the 
flow of commerce are not in violation of the Commerce Clause. 
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). As such, 
assuming that the Court proceeds on the merits of CARE‟s 
challenge, ERAA should be found constitutional. 
i. ERAA is not Per Se Unconstitutional. 
The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall 
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although “phrased as a grant 
of regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been 
understood to have a „negative‟ aspect that denies the States the 
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the 
interstate flow of articles of commerce.” Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). With 
certain exceptions, the negative, or dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibits states from discriminating against the free flow of 
interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause applies to the 
interstate flow of hazardous waste. Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. 
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340 (1992); see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 
621-23 (“All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause 
protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset.”). 
ERAA is best categorized as a quarantine law that 
distinguishes waste by toxicity and not origin.  Thus, it cannot be 
per se unconstitutional. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629; see also 
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 
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137 (1902) (holding constitutional quarantines banning the 
importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required 
destruction as soon as possible because their very movement 
risked contagion). 
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey the Court found that a New 
Jersey law prohibiting the importation of most “solid or liquid 
waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial 
limits of the State” to be a violation of the Commerce Clause. 437 
U.S. at 629. The Court held that the law violated the principle of 
nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than 
waste produced within the state.  Id. Since New Jersey could not 
demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between 
foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the 
Court that the state had “overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow 
of commerce for protectionist reasons” and struck down the New 
Jersey law.  Id. at 628. 
EPA concedes that provisions of ERAA touch upon matters of 
interstate commerce and are subject to analysis under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  As such, if the legislation is 
protectionist, it is per se unconstitutional.  Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 
at 626.  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey there was no way to 
distinguish the banned out-of-state waste from the waste created 
within New Jersey.  Id. at 629.  Thus, if one is harmful so is the 
other and to discriminate solely on origin is protectionist and 
unconstitutional.  Id.  This prejudicial and protectionist 
distinction of in-state versus out-of-state is not found in the 
ERAA.  All forms of Pollutant X, whether native or foreign to 
New Union, are treated equally under ERAA.  Thus, ERAA is 
better categorized as a quarantine law, which does not 
“discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply 
prevent[s] traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.”  Id.  
Therefore, ERAA is not per se unconstitutional. 
ii. ERAA Addresses Legitimate State Concerns 
Which Outweigh Any Negative Ramifications to 
Commerce in the Least Discriminatory Manner 
Possible. 
1. New Union’s Legitimate State Concerns 
Outweigh Possible Impediment to Interstate 
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Commerce 
When a state law falls within the realm of the Commerce 
Clause, the legitimate concerns of the state must be weighed 
against effects the legislation has on interstate commerce. Kassel, 
450 U.S. at 662 (1981).  New Union‟s legitimate concern for the 
possible contamination of Pollutant X through the state 
outweighs any negative effects that ERAA may have on interstate 
commerce. (R. at 3). 
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation, the Court 
found that an Iowa statute that prohibited the use of 65-foot 
double trailer trucks, but permitted 55-foot single trailer trucks 
within the state unconstitutionally burdened interstate 
commerce. 450 U.S. at 662.  To reach this conclusion, the Court 
employed a balancing test that compared the nature of the state‟s 
regulatory concern with the extent of the burden to interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 670.  Justice Powell noted that while a state‟s 
power to regulate commerce is never greater than in matters of 
local concern, such justifications could not be illusory.  Id. Since 
the Idaho law placed a great burden on interstate commerce and 
Iowa had failed to present any persuasive evidence that the 65-
foot doubles were less safe than 55-foot singles to counterbalance 
these concerns of commerce, the Court struck down the law.  Id. 
at 671 
Following the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, since 
ERAA is not protectionist, the Court should apply the balancing 
test utilized under Kassel. 450 U.S. at 662. Under this test, for 
ERAA to be constitutional, the benefits of keeping Pollutant X out 
of New Union must outweigh the burden this exclusion places 
upon inter-State commerce. Id. In light of New Union‟s 
reasonable provisions allowing safe and expedited passage of 
Pollutant X through the state, as well as the safety considerations 
of surrounding states, it is in the best interest of all that ERAA 
remain in effect. Its limited influence on interstate commerce is 
outweighed by the serious threat of contamination, recognized by 
both the World Health Organization and EPA.  (R. at 3). 
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2. ERAA is the Least Discriminatory Option 
Available to New Union. 
Mindful of New Union‟s current inability to process Pollutant 
X, ERAA can be warranted as the least discriminatory option 
available to deal with handling such a toxic and dangerous 
pollutant. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 340.  A state lacking 
certain types of waste disposal facilities is not uncommon and 
Congress has recognized that not all states can process all 
pollutants. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713, 717 (11th Cir. 1990). 
In Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, the petitioner 
operated a commercial hazardous waste land disposal facility in 
Emelle, Alabama, that received both in-state and out-of-state 
wastes. 504 U.S. at 337.  An Alabama act imposed, inter alia, a 
fee on hazardous wastes disposed of at in-state commercial 
facilities, and an additional fee on hazardous wastes generated 
outside, but disposed of inside, the state.  Id.  The Court found 
that Alabama‟s differential treatment of out-of-state waste 
violated the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 339.  The Court held that 
Alabama had not met its burden of showing the unavailability of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local 
interests at stake and thus found the law in question 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 341. 
The court in Chemical Waste Management held that the state 
has a burden of showing the unavailability of nondiscriminatory 
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake, and 
that the state must first explore less discriminatory means. 504 
U.S. at 340.  In the case at hand, New Union can make such a 
showing. ERAA is a necessary measure that allows New Union to 
handle Pollutant X at a time when New Union is not equipped 
with facilities that are capable of handling such a volatile and 
toxic substance.  It has been recognized by Congress on several 
occasions that because of geological factors or for other reasons, 
every state may not be able to create disposal facilities within its 
borders and will not be able to dispose of its waste within its own 
borders.  Nat’l Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 717.  Often a state that 
cannot safely dispose of wastes within its borders will reach 
agreements with another states (or states) to create mutually 
beneficial arrangements to deal with such shortcomings.  Id. 
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Since New Union is using the least discriminatory means 
possible to address legitimate state concerns that outweigh any 
apprehension of interruption to the flow of commerce, ERAA 
should be found constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that (1) 
district courts have jurisdiction to order EPA to act on CARE‟s 
petition; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to 
district courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition; and (3) 
EPA‟s failure to act on the petition was not a constructive denial 
and constructive determination.  If the Court does find there was 
a constructive denial and determination, the Court should not lift 
the stay on C.A. No. 18-2010, and should instead remand to the 
district court to order EPA to act.  If the Court proceeds on the 
merits, it should find that EPA is not required to withdraw 
approval of New Union‟s program because (1) its resources and 
performance continue to meet RCRA approval criteria; (2) the 
failure to regulate railroad hazardous waste facilities does not 
require withdrawal of approval; and (3) ERAA does not affect the 
New Union state program‟s equivalency, consistency, or 
compliance with the Commerce Clause. 
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